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Abstract 
Although comparative research on new public management reforms has identified variable 
pathways of change between countries, less is known about variations within countries where there 
has been significant political and administrative decentralisation to regional tiers of government. In 
this paper we address this concern, focusing on public hospital management reforms in the Italian 
Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN) as an illustrative case. Drawing on a range of publicly available 
administrative data sources we find that there is a significant regional dimension, with more 
autonomous regional governments with right- wing political majorities being more likely to adopt 
corporate style management practices at hospital level. 
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A goal of New Public Management (NPM) reforms in many countries has been to increase the 
autonomy of public organisations (such as hospitals) and recruit more business experts to run them 
(Hood and Lodge, 2006). But, while these changes have been global in nature, the available 
research cautions against any tendency to overstate convergence. This is undoubtedly true at the 
national level, where the research points to distinctive change pathways that are heavily influenced 
by the institutional contexts of each country (Ashworth et al, 2013; Hammerschmid et al, 2013). 
Hood (1995), for example, differentiates between ‘high’ and ‘low’ NPM-adopter groups of 
countries. Similarly, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, 34) assert that ‘conceptually identical reforms 
develop differently in one national context as compared with another’.  
 
However, despite this understanding of the role of national institutions in shaping NPM reforms, 
there is still a risk of glossing over the full extent of variation. This is especially the case in those 
countries where key decisions on the management and design of public services are more 
decentralised to regional and local tiers of government (Paris et al, 2010; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Sandall, 2008). In these contexts, it is possible that there have also been significant path dependent 
variations in the implementation of public management reforms within countries. This in turn may 
have been influenced not only by the level of autonomy enjoyed by regions to respond to local 
conditions, but also – just as at the national level – by the political preferences of ruling elites. 
 
Recently, there has been some interest in exploring the impact of this ‘regional dimension’ on 
the performance of public services (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006; Andrews and Martin, 2010). 
However, less attention has focused on how decentralisation might impact on the adoption of NPM 
reforms or the factors that might explain variations. Potentially important here is the degree of 
autonomy of regions, influencing their discretion to make decisions and the role of political 
orientations at regional level. The latter is suggested by the wider NPM literature, notably in 
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relation to studies focusing on local government (Hansen, 2011; Fredriksson et al, 2010; Wassenaar 
et al, 2013).  
 
In this paper our aim is to address this concern focusing on the case of health service 
management reforms in one country context: Italy. Italy is theoretically interesting because, 
although it has a unified national health service - the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN) - with 
attempts since the early 1990s to restructure management (Lega et al, 2010), it is also a ‘unitary-
decentralised’ state (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011) with considerable decision making power 
delegated to regional governments in selected areas, including health. As we shall see, regional 
governments have been key players in shaping the nature and trajectory of public management 
reforms (Mattei, 2007), although how far this has resulted in real differences in adoption remains 
unclear. 
Focusing on this national case, we investigate two related questions. First what is the extent of a 
regional effect on the implementation of hospital management reforms? Second, are the reforms 
mediated by the context of the regions in terms of: a) the degree of autonomy of regions and; b) the 
political orientation of the regional governments, responsible for the design and delivery of 
healthcare services? In what follows we first review the existing literature on this topic, prior to 
describing the data, methods and main findings of our study focusing on Italian public hospitals.  
 
Literature review  
Hospital management reforms: convergent and divergent tendencies 
Health systems are facing growing pressure to control resources in the face of rising costs, new 
technologies and demographic trends (Kuhlmann and Annandale, 2012). Governments have 
responded to this in different ways, although a common focus has been on seeking to enhance the 
management capabilities of hospitals and other provider organisations. Specifically this has led to 
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the development of what Kirkpatrick et al (2013) describe as ‘corporate style’ models of public 
hospital management. 
 
A hallmark of this more corporate hospital management model is changes in governance ‘that 
seek to make public hospitals semi-autonomous, with their own separate supervisory boards and 
with considerable independence of decision making’ (Saltman et al, 2011, 7) . Changes to the legal 
status of some hospitals and increases in the financial autonomy and decision making capacity of 
governing boards, are all (at least in theory) designed to increase the flexibility of managers to 
respond to local (or market) demands and improve the quality and effectiveness of services. In line 
with this change have also been moves to strengthen the management capabilities of hospitals, for 
instance recruiting a larger number of managers from the private sector. This represents ‘part of the 
New Public Management zeitgeist’ (Petrovsky et al, 2014, 4) and has been especially marked in 
health services. Indeed, Durán et al, (2011, 43), note how ‘NPM reforms have often sought to 
weaken the managerial role of physicians by opening up institutional management positions to 
professional managers who may be non-clinicians’. These reforms have also pushed for the 
establishment of dedicated management and administrative support functions in public hospitals, for 
example in areas such as finance, planning, human resources, audit and procurement (Ackroyd et al, 
2007).  
 
These ideas about how and why to best transform the management of public hospitals have been 
widely disseminated around the world. However, as we noted earlier, while it is possible to define 
common templates of hospital management, it would be a mistake to over-state convergence. 
Comparative research on health management has identified variations in the timing, pace and 
objectives of healthcare management reforms and ‘distinctive national or regional variants’ (Dent, 
2005, 624). Dorgan et al (2010) for example, note that while non-clinically qualified 
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managers/administrators make up approximately 42% of all managers in the hospital system of the 
UK, the figure is 36% in France and only 10% in Italy.  
 
Regionalism and public management reforms 
Notwithstanding this growing understanding of how national politics are shaping healthcare 
reforms, questions remain about the extent to which this is also the case within countries. Important 
here may be the degree to which the authority of central governments has been decentralised to 
regional tiers of administration (Lee and Haque, 2006). On the one hand this can represent a form of 
political decentralisation where regions may elect their own governments, especially in what Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2011) term federal states, where there is a formal separation of powers giving 
regions considerable autonomy legally enshrined in a constitution (for example in Germany). It may 
also apply to unitary states where, although political powers remain concentrated centrally, there 
has been extensive delegation of powers to regions, notably in the UK and Italy (see below).  
 
More often than not, this political decentralisation goes hand in hand with varying degrees of 
administrative decentralisation to regions, including powers to fund and manage public services, 
including health (Paris et al, 2010; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). In the UK, for example, 
since 1999 the newly established Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales have 
assumed direct responsibility for delivering public services and exercise considerable autonomy 
over the ways in which these are managed and regulated (Andrews and Martin, 2010). Political 
decentralisation in Spain has also led to the (variable) transfer of healthcare responsibilities from the 
Central Government to seventeen Autonomous Communities (Antón et al, 2014). 
 
Returning to the main concerns of this paper, while the research is limited, all the implications 
are that a combination of political and administrative decentralisation to regions will have a 
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significant impact on the uptake of NPM reforms. In the UK, for example, it is noted how devolved 
regions (Scotland and Wales) have implemented quite different models of governance in the 
National Health Service (NHS), with less emphasis on markets and competition than England 
(Andrews and Martin, 2010), Similar observations have been made about health care reforms in 
Spain, notably in the models of hospital governance that have been adopted by regions (Álvarez and 
Durán, 2011). As such, our first hypothesis is that: 
 
H1: Countries where there is a high level of political and administrative decentralisation to 
regions are likely to display variations in the extent to which public hospital management reforms 
are adopted. 
 
A further set of questions relate to what conditions influence this variation? Here, two factors 
may be important. First concerns the level of autonomy regions enjoy and the extent to which 
political and administrative decentralisation has occurred (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). This 
is most likely in countries that have pursued hybrid, two track models of decentralisation. For 
example, in the UK and Spain both political and administrative decentralisation varies between 
regions (Andrews and Martin, 2010; Costa-Font and Rico, 2006). In the former, Wales and Scotland 
have significantly more delegated powers when compared to England (Andrews and Martin, 2010). 
As we shall see, in Italy there has also been an asymmetrical devolution, with some regions holding 
additional powers (originally granted by the 1948 Constitution) to determine the funding levels of 
key public services such as health. Hence it is important, in some contexts, to recognise variations 
between regions in the level of autonomy they exercise to shape policy and innovate with new ways 
of organising services. This in turn, leads us to hypothesise that:  
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H2a: Variations in the adoption of public hospital management reforms will be influenced by 
variations in the level of political and administrative decentralisation to regions. 
 
A second factor likely to influence variation in the adoption of NPM reforms are the political 
orientations of regional governments. Support for this assumption comes from a number of studies 
that have analysed the influence of local politics on public administration, with the expectation ‘that 
right-wing parties will be more supportive of NPM reforms than left wing parties’ (Lee and Haque, 
2006, 606). Hence, Fredriksson et al (2010, 637) find that right wing parties tended to be hold more 
positive ‘attitudes towards and perceptions of competitive tendering’ in the case of Finnish social 
services, while Stolt and Winblad (2009) draw similar conclusions with regard to elderly social care 
services in Sweden. Although there have been fewer studies focusing on regional levels of 
government, the available research points in the same direction. Focusing on the manifestos of 
Italian political parties Fattore et al (2012, 229) conclude that ‘NPM seems more popular with the 
political right than the centre-left coalition’. Reay and Hinings (2009) also note how the dominance 
of a pro-market political ideology in the context of Alberta was partially responsible for policies 
aimed at making health services more ‘business-like’. Of course, an important caveat is that in 
recent years, some centre-left governments (for instance, New Labour in the UK) have supported 
NPM reforms, including limited privatisation. However, in these cases there is often a more 
pragmatic emphasis on notions of ‘best value’ and rhetoric of adopting new management practices 
on the basis of what works, as opposed to ideology (Newman and Clarke, 2009). As such, our final 
hypothesis is that: 
 
H2b: The adoption of public hospital management reforms will be greater in regions dominated 
by right wing political parties. 
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Hospital management reforms in Italy and the regional dimension 
To address these concerns, we focus on the specific case of health reforms in one European state: 
Italy. Following a pattern common to other countries, Italy has embarked on a process of NPM-
driven reforms since the beginning of the 1990s. These reforms covered the whole public sector 
addressing matters of common interest such as relations with service users, organisation and 
rationalisation of resources, human resource management, and administrative decentralisation 
(Anessi Pessina and Cantù, 2006). 
 
In this context, specific attention has been given to the management of healthcare (Lega et al, 
2010). An early reform in 1992-93 reduced the number of local health providers from about 660 to 
around 200 local health enterprises (Aziende Sanitarie Locali). At the same time, it allowed around 
100 public hospitals the opportunity to convert into semi-independent hospitals (Aziende 
Ospedaliere). The aim of this re-organisation was to introduce greater competition into the SSN 
also opening up possibilities for the entry of private providers (Jommi et al, 2001). This re-
structuring went hand in hand with attempts to strengthen management capabilities of Italian public 
hospitals. The latter was characterised by the introduction of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO - 
Direttore Generale) role, with greater authority (and accountability) of clinical directorates (Lega, 
2008).  
 
In these respects Italy has followed the path of many other countries in seeking to develop the 
management capabilities of public hospitals (Kirkpatrick et al, 2013). However, of central concern 
to us in this paper is the regional dimension of these reforms. Italy is a textbook example of unitary 
and increasingly decentralised state, characterised by a medium level of vertical dispersion of power 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Initially highly centralised after the shift from monarchic state to 
republic following the Second World War, a degree of political autonomy was underwritten by the 
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1948 constitution. The process of administrative decentralisation however was given a further boost 
by a major constitutional reform in 2001 (Tediosi et al, 2009), making Italy to some extent 
comparable to the institutional architecture of Nordic European countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011).  
 
With regard to healthcare, while central government continues to influence core funding and 
service guidelines, Italian Regions have responsibility both for the allocation of funds and the 
organisation and administration of services locally. In relation to financing, regions access a central 
pot of resources (the Fondo Sanitario Nazionale - FSN), determined by a weighted capitation 
formula, but can also allocate their own resources from local taxation. More specifically, regions 
can change the allocation of funding between primary and secondary care and adjust national fees 
for services for the financing of public and private hospitals. They also have powers to: determine 
the governance model of healthcare services; to establish and clarify the strategies and objectives 
needed to implement them; and, crucially, to appoint, evaluate and (if necessary) fire the CEOs of 
hospitals (Tediosi et al, 2009).  
 
Italy therefore represents an archetypal case of a system where - consistent with H1 - we might 
expect there to be considerable variation between regions in the implementation of health 
management reforms. In addition to this, since the 1948 Constitution, five autonomous regions 
(Aosta Valley; Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol; Friuli-Venezia Giulia; Sardinia and Sicily) have been 
awarded even greater legislative, administrative and financial autonomy in the running of public 
services, including healthcare. These regions do not receive state funding for the financing of 
healthcare spending, but allocate their own resources with only a minimal contribution from the 
FSN in some cases. In this respect, Italy is also a country where there is internal variation in the 
level of administrative decentralisation, a point that may be significant with respect to H2a. 
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Finally, the available research suggests that in Italy right-wing political coalitions are historically 
more prone towards NPM-style reforms compared to centre-left coalitions. Right-wing parties are 
mostly associated with a neo-liberal political ideology that is traditionally pro-market and likely to 
impose more stringent limits on public expenditure. Conversely, centre-left parties traditionally 
share a preference for relatively large governments, and are more inclined to expand the provision 
of social services (Fattore et al, 2012). As such, Italy represents a useful illustrative case to test our 
third hypothesis (H2b) regarding the influence of regional politics on the implementation of public 
hospital management reforms.  
 
Methods 
To test our hypotheses we focus on management reforms in independent publicly owned hospitals 
in the Italian SSN. These hospitals can be divided into three categories: general hospitals (Aziende 
Ospedaliere – AOs), teaching hospitals (Aziende Ospedaliero-Universitarie – AOUs) and research 
hospitals (Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Speciale – IRCCSs).  
Due to the lack of a central repository of information on Italian hospital governance the first step 
was to construct a unique dataset by manually working through hospital websites. Our sample of 
hospital CEOs was taken from their appointment decrees published on the Regions, while all other 
information (on hospital staff composition and our control variables) was accessed through the 
Italian Ministry of Health’s main data repository.  
 
The total population of public hospitals in the Ministry of Health database amounted to 105 
organisations in 2011. A number of hospitals were excluded from our analysis because of 
organisation changes during the period under investigation and others due to the absence of reliable 
information on governance. This left a final sample of 90 hospitals in 2008, 93 hospitals in 2009, 98 
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hospitals in 2010 and 98 hospitals in 2011. The data covers four years (2008-2011) for the hospital 
CEOs professional and educational background and two years (2009-2010) for the ratio of hospital 
administrative staff to clinical staff.  
 
Dependent variables 
Three proxies were used to assess the extent to which a ‘corporate style’ of hospital management 
has been implemented in Italian public hospitals. First is whether hospital CEOs had clinical or 
non-clinical professional backgrounds. Historically clinicians have dominated the Italian health 
system, including senior leadership roles (Tousijn, 2002). In this regard, the appointment of CEOs 
with a non-clinical background indicates a break from the norm, reflecting a stronger commitment 
amongst policy makers to experiment with new approaches to management. We therefore created a 
dummy variable (NonClinCEO), distinguishing between hospital CEOs with clinical (medicine and 
nursing) professional expertise from those CEOs who were not clinicians (generally career civil 
servants as well as individuals with professional background in the private sector).  
 
Second, we consider the educational background of non-clinical CEOs, differentiating between 
those with an academic degree in business-oriented disciplines and those with a degree in 
administrative sciences. The appointment of senior executives with a greater understanding and 
affinity with business disciplines is indicative, we argue, of an even stronger commitment to 
corporate style management reforms, in contrast with the Italian tradition of selecting for top 
executive positions senior civil servants with a background in administrative sciences (Cassese, 
1999). Another dummy variable (BusCEO) allowed us to distinguish CEOs with an academic 
degree in business-type disciplines (Economics / Finance / Management / Business / Accounting) 
and those CEOs with an academic degree in administrative sciences (Law / Political Science).  
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Lastly, we focus on the size of the administrative staff of hospitals (relative to clinical, 
operational staff) as a proxy for the level of commitment to the development of management 
capabilities within hospitals (Kirkpatrick et al, 2013; Ackroyd et al, 2007). Although a number of 
factors may influence staffing levels (Andrews and Boyne, 2014), we argue that an increase in the 
proportion of administrators is indicative of wider organisational changes in public hospitals. 
Following Mintzberg (1993), it suggests a move away from the traditional models of ‘professional 
bureaucracy’ – dominated by a clinical ‘operating core’ – towards an organisation where greater 
resources are devoted to ‘support staff’ and ‘technostructure’ functions, both of which suggest more 
active ‘management’ or ‘administration’ of professional work. To make these comparisons, we used 
the ratio between the number of hospital employees involved in non health related functions at the 
managerial and clerical levels (for example, HR, accounting and other supporting services), and 
those with direct involvement in the healthcare provision (AdmSTAFF). This classification draws 
on the categorisation of healthcare public sector employees officially used by the Italian Ministry of 
Health. 
 
Using these proxies, to test H1 we performed Chi-square analyses for the dummy variables 
related to CEOs expertise and ANOVA analysis for the administrative staff continuous variable. To 
test H2a and H2b, we used Logistic regressions for the variable related to CEOs professional 
expertise and multiple linear OLS regressions for the administrative staff variable. Further Chi-
square analysis was carried out to investigate the significance of the difference in non-clinical CEOs 
educational background. 
 
Independent and control variables 
Turning our attention to the independent variables, we explored whether two main factors explained 
the degree of implementation of NPM reforms in hospital management. First, in line with H2a, we 
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focused on the degree of autonomy enjoyed by a minority (5 out of 21) of the regions 
(AutREGION), differentiating between autonomous and non autonomous regions. As noted earlier, 
the former are the regions awarded by the 1948 Constitution a special statute that recognises, among 
other areas, greater decision making power in healthcare matters, powers that were further 
expanded by the 2001 reform.  
 
Second, to test H2b we explore the predominant political orientation of the regional government 
(RightREGION). Here a dummy variable was used to differentiate between centre-right and centre-
left regional governments. For the analysis investigating the CEOs professional and educational 
background, the political majority of the regional government was determined at the CEO 
appointment date. Conversely, for specifications of the empirical model analysing the staff 
composition (AdmSTAFF), the political majority in the regional government was determined at the 
t-1 period.  
 
To account for the possible impact of organisational characteristics and the context on hospital 
management five control variables were included in the analysis. First, we controlled for the 
managerial complexity of hospitals according to their size, using the log transformation of the total 
number of beds available (SIZE). Larger hospital are generally more complex to manage which, in 
turn, might account for who is appointed CEO and the proportion of administrative staff. Second, 
we controlled for the hospital case mix to capture the degree of hospital operational complexity 
(CaseMIX) (Fetter et al, 1980). A higher case mix in relation to the national mean indicates that a 
hospital caters for patients with a greater severity of illnesses and treatments required and, posing 
different management challenges. Third, hospitals were differentiated according to their status, by 
distinguishing general hospitals (AOs) from teaching (AOUs - TeacHOSP) and research (IRCCSs - 
ResHOSP) hospitals. We expected that AOs were more likely to be associated with a non-clinical 
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CEO, in part because of the special autonomy they had been granted to manage their own affairs. 
Fourth, we checked for the possible impact of hospital competition on the degree of NPM 
implementation, using a Herfindahl index of hospital concentration by region. Because these results 
were not significant they are not reported here. Finally, time dummies were included to control for 
time effects.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Findings 
In line with the Italian tradition of having clinicians in top executive positions, we found that, on 
average, public hospitals in our sample were more likely to be led by clinical CEOs (59.6%). Of the 
remaining non-clinical CEOs (40.4%), the majority were civil servants with degrees in 
administrative sciences. Only a quarter of the hospitals in this group (23.2%), or 6.9% overall, were 
led by CEOs with a business-type educational background (see Table 1). This suggests that 
hospitals with a more pronounced corporate style model of governance represented the minority of 
our sample. With regard to the breakdown of hospital staff, on average, the proportion of 
administrative staff to clinical staff stood at around 41%, although there were wide variations 
between hospitals (from 17 to roughly 69 per cent). 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 2 reports the Pearson bivariate correlations of the variables employed, which allows to 
check for possible multicollinearity between independent and control variables. As a rule of thumb, 
a problem of multicollinearity exists if the pair‐wise correlation coefficients between two regressors 
is high, normally in excess of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2004). The figures reported in the table indicate that the 
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pair‐wise correlation coefficients for each of the independent and control variables in the regression 
models ranged from -0.422 to 0.327 with only two exceptions. One was the relatively high, 
significant correlation (-0.704) between the dummy for research hospital status and the hospital 
size. Indeed, IRCCs were expected to be of smaller size in comparison to the other two types of 
service providers in the sample as they are traditionally organisations that focus intensively on their 
research activity and offer limited, specialised services to patients. However, the tests for the 
Variance Inflation Factor and tolerance were all within acceptable limits for the variables employed. 
We therefore did not proceed to exclude any variable. Second, the coefficient (0.879) above the 
indicative upper limit value between ‘RightREGION (CEO)’ and ‘RightREGION (t-1)’ did not 
raise concerns as these dummy variables were not employed in the same specifications of the 
regression models. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
First, Chi-square analyses (for NonClinCEO and BusCEO) and ANOVA analysis (for 
AdmSTAFF) were performed to check if the regional dimension had any impact on hospital 
management reforms (H1). The results of these tests were significant at the customary levels for 
each of three proxies of public management reforms employed (see Table 3 Panel A). This supports 
our first hypothesis that within a unitary-decentralised state like Italy, the regional dimension has an 
impact on the implementation of hospital management reforms. 
 
We also performed Chi-square and ANOVA analyses of our proxies of NPM across the Italian 
geographical areas (North, Centre and South of Italy). The tests showed statistically significant 
variations, but the geographical distribution does not explain variations in the implementation of 
reforms (see Table 3 Panel B). While Non-Clinical CEO are more likely to lead hospitals located in 
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regions of the South of Italy (53.21%) than of the North (39.32%) and the Centre (21.31%), 
business-CEOs appeared to be more likely appointed in regions in the North (30.19%) than within 
the South (21.74%) and Centre (0.00%). Statistically significant differences were also found in 
relation to the size of the administrative staff (0.463 in the North, 0.341 in the South, 0.332 in the 
Centre). 
 
The next section reports our findings relating to H2a and H2b. Specifically it considers the impact 
of two factors (degree of administrative autonomy and political orientation) on the three specific 
dimensions of public hospital reforms.  
 
Appointment of non-clinical CEOs 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Turning to our first proxy (NonClinCEO), as shown in Table 4, the findings of the different 
specifications of the Logistic regression model testing the effect of political orientation and regional 
autonomy on CEO’s clinical/non-clinical professional background were highly significant. Thus, 
our analyses provide support for H2a and H2b. As we predicted, specifications (1) and (2) of the 
model highlighted respectively a positive and highly significant impact of the autonomous status of 
the region (β = 1.382, p <0.01) and centre-right political majority in the regional government (β = 
0.789, p <0.01) on the likelihood of having a non-clinical CEO running a hospital. In specification 
(3) we then considered both main independent variables and, as shown in the table 4, the 
coefficients maintained the same positive sign with a relatively lower statistical explanatory power 
only for ‘RightREGION (CEO)’ variable (p <0.05). We also checked for the interaction effect 
between the two main explanatory variables. Unsurprisingly, the evidence appears to suggest an 
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even greater likelihood of appointing a hospital CEO with a non-clinical background when the 
region is autonomous AND controlled by a centre-right political majority (β = 2.019, p <0.05).  
 
As for the control variables, hospital size appeared to negatively affect the probability of having 
CEOs with non-clinical background, with a p-value statistically significant in all three model 
specifications. The proxy for operational complexity (case mix) did however not provide significant 
results. Research status of hospitals also seemed to negatively and significantly affect the presence 
of non-clinical CEOs. This can be explained by the fact that research hospitals are fundamentally 
less autonomous than the other two types of hospitals, being mainly and directly funded by the 
(central) Italian Ministry of Health. The recognition of the IRCCS status is further subordinated to a 
periodical check conducted at the national, central level (Compagni and Tediosi, 2012). By contrast, 
the results were far less conclusive where teaching hospital status was concerned. 
 
Appointment of CEOs with business qualifications  
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Turning to our second proxy (BusCEO), Table 5 reports the findings of Chi-square tests, showing 
that hospitals led by CEOs with educational backgrounds in business-oriented disciplines compared 
with those organisations led by CEOs with an academic degree in administrative disciplines, were 
clearly less numerous in our sample. Consistent with our predictions, hospitals governed by 
business-CEOs were more likely to be located within autonomous regions (25%) than within non 
autonomous ones (22.62%). Similarly, business-CEOs appeared to be more likely appointed in 
regions with centre-right governments (30.65%) than with a centre-left political majority (14%). 
Importantly, the Chi-square test was statistically significant only with reference to the political 
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orientation variable (4.302, p <0.05) and not in relation of the special autonomy of the region, 
although this could have been determined by the relatively limited number of cases. Thus, for the 
second proxy of NPM, we can assert that while H2b is supported, our findings are not significantly 
consistent with H2a. As a further robustness test, logistic regressions were carried out. The results of 
this analysis were similar but, mindful of the relatively limited number of observations in relation to 
the number of variables used, are not presented here. 
 
With regard to other predictors, the presence of a business-CEO was far more likely to occur 
within general hospitals (30.14%), than within teaching (13.79%) and research (0%) hospitals 
(6.430, p <0.05). Again, this can be explained with the fact that AOs are more autonomous and less 
subjected to institutional control which provides a fertile terrain for the adoption of corporate-style 
governance approaches (Anessi Pessina and Cantù, 2006).  
 
Development of administrative staff functions 
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Finally, Table 6 shows the outcomes of the analysis focused on the third proxy for NPM 
implementation (AdmSTAFF). The results of OLS regressions using the level of regional autonomy 
as an independent variable were inconsistent and therefore did not support H2a. However, our 
analysis did suggest that the ratio of administrative and clerical staff to health staff was positively 
related to the presence of a centre-right political majority in the regional government, a finding that 
was statistically highly significant (respectively β = 0.103, p <0.01, and β = 0.119, p <0.01), thus 
supporting H2b. Further analysis for an interaction effect between these variables failed to produce 
statistically significant results.  
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Turning to other predictors in the model, as can be seen from Table 6, it would seem that more 
specialised hospitals require a greater investment in administrative and clerical resources supporting 
hospital management. This may be partly explained by the variety and complexity of activities 
related to teaching and research (Del Vecchio and Cuccurullo, 2013).  
 
Concluding discussion 
A starting point for this paper is the observation that while the literature has noted variations in the 
implementation of NPM policies between countries, less attention has focused on a possible 
regional dimension to change in countries where policy control over public services is significantly 
decentralised (Paris et al, 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Taking Italy as an illustrative case our 
aim in this paper has been to address this concern focusing on the questions of whether and how 
regionalism affects the adoption of ‘corporate style’ type of hospital management. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, our findings lend support to the first hypothesis (H1) about the impact of regional 
decentralisation (political and administrative) on the formal adoption of NPM reforms. Consistent 
with observations made elsewhere in the literature (Andrews and Martin, 2010; Antón et al, 2014), 
we saw how in Italy there was some variation between regions in the extent to which aspects of 
‘corporate style’ management (CEOS with business backgrounds and increased levels of 
administration) had been adopted.  
 
The study findings also help to address more specific questions about the antecedents of this 
variation. First this is with regard to H2a, concerning the impact of the level of regional autonomy 
on the adoption of NPM policies and practices. Although the findings were mixed our analysis 
shows that regions with greater autonomy were more likely to depart from convention and appoint 
CEOs with non-clinical backgrounds. Even stronger support was found for H2b focusing on the 
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impact of right wing political orientations on the adoption of more ‘corporate style’ models of 
hospital governance and administration.  
 
Consequently, the paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it goes beyond 
existing accounts of national path dependency in the adoption of public management reforms 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Dent, 2005) to highlight the importance of further regional variations, 
within states. While this possibility has been hinted at in some of the literature (Fattore et al, 2012; 
Reay and Hinings, 2009), to date it has not been explored systematically. Of course it remains to be 
seen how far the tendencies we observe apply to other countries where there has been significant 
decentralisation. But even with this caveat our study remains useful in highlighting the importance 
of the regional dimension in wider comparative research on public management reforms (Ashworth 
et al, 2013).  
 
A second, related, implication of our study is to highlight some of the antecedents of regional 
variation, especially with regard to political orientations. While more longitudinal research is 
needed to fully establish the direction of causality it is notable just how significant these political 
orientations are in the Italian case, not just on CEO appointments (as one might expect), but on 
actual levels of administration in public hospitals. Indeed, the latter suggests a quite different 
explanation for ‘administrative intensity’ in public services, to those – drawing on contingency 
theory - which emphasise more the technical characteristics of organisations (Andrews and Boyne, 
2014).  
 
Lastly, our study has implications for understanding change in the Italian context. In particular, it 
highlights the links between political commitments, greater autonomy in regions and (arguably) key 
decisions regarding the management of public hospitals. The importance of Italian regions in 
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mediating the nature and direction of health reforms is well understood in the literature (Mattei, 
2006). However, until now, it has been hard to say precisely how far (if at all) this impacted on the 
adoption off management practices locally.  
 
Obviously, when drawing these conclusions a number of caveats and areas for further research 
need to be considered. As noted already, more work is needed to assert the direction of causality. 
More focused (possibly case study based) research would also be useful to explore the dynamics of 
how policy decisions about hospital management are made by regions and the impact of other 
factors, such as the strength of political networks and relative stability of governments over time. 
Following on from this, work could be done to test how far the regional dimension of public 
management policy making is apparent in other countries, including those that have unitary 
decentralised and more federal political structures (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Lastly are 
questions about the role of political orientations on public management policy. While this study 
(and others) have found a strong correlation between centre-right (neo-liberal) politics and these 
reforms, it is possible that, in other contexts, centre-left or even left-leaning governments may 
favour changes in public management. A classic example of this, as we noted earlier, is the 1997-
2010 New Labour administration in the UK which pursued health management reforms with great 
vigour (Newman and Clarke, 2009). 
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, our analysis breaks new ground in helping to quantify the impact 
of regionalism on the adoption of public management reforms and to specify the role of autonomy 
and political orientations in this process. While more work is needed to refine this analysis and look 
beyond the Italian case, our findings highlight the importance of this ‘regional dimension’ and how 
it needs to be given more weight in other studies exploring the comparative developments in public 
management within as well as between countries.  
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